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Abstract
This paper provides evidence of a link between specialisation patterns −
in intermediate inputs or final goods − and business cycle correlations:
countries with a similar intermediate-good content of exports tend to
have more correlated GDP fluctuations and external balances. We pro-
duce a model that replicates these facts. A productivity shock in a large
country ("the U.S.") has a smaller effect on the terms of trade of coun-
tries that share its specialisation, while being shared fully with countries
specialised in the other type of good through a terms-of-trade effect. In
the presence of complete asset markets, the trade balance reflects the
flow of insurance payments. All countries who benefit little from the
shock in the large country will have correlated, negative net exports.
The trade balances of all other countries will jointly move in the oppo-
site direction.
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1 Introduction
International trade is widely recognized as an important transmission mecha-
nism of international business cycles (for example, see Baxter and Kouparitsas,
2004). However, as yet there seems to be little understanding of how differences
in industrial structures across countries affect the business-cycle transmission
via trade linkages, and the determination of trade balances.1
This paper considers one key difference between countries − the extent to
which they act as intermediate-input suppliers as opposed to final-good pro-
ducers in international production chains. We gauge the difference in countries’
production structures along this dimension from the share of their exports used
as production inputs, and highlight that this measure of specialisation seems
to be relevant for predicting the strength of business-cycle co-movement: coun-
try pairs that display more similar specialisation patterns appear to have more
correlated GDP fluctuations and trade balances.
We then offer an explanation for our empirical findings based on a model
with a large country (“the U.S.”) and many small countries specialised either
in intermediate or final-good production. A crucial assumption of the model
is that the elasticity of substitution between intermediate and final goods is
1, while the elasticity of substitution between different varieties of intermedi-
ate goods, or different varieties of final goods, is larger than 1. In this set-
ting, shocks to the large country affect countries with different specialisation
patterns differently through the terms of trade. Countries sharing the large
country’s specialisation experience a smaller increase in incomes than the rest
of the world, because their terms of trade respond less strongly. This gives
rise to a positive association between similarity in specialisation patterns and
GDP correlations.
When allowing for international asset trade, our model also has impli-
cations for the trade balance. The GDPs of countries that share the same
specialisation pattern are affected similarly by shocks originating in the large
country. Thus, to the extent that the trade balance reflects international in-
surance payments, the trade balances of similarly specialised countries will
move in the same direction.
International production linkages − whereby industries in some countries
1Backus et al. (1992) first pointed out a number of anomalies in the canonical open-
economy real business cycle model. The most relevant of these to our work is the so-called
“trade co-movement puzzle”, established by Kose and Yi (2006): the empirically observed
relationship between bilateral trade and GDP correlations is far stronger than the standard
model would suggest. Subsequently, Kraay and Ventura (2007) pointed out that the strength
and synchronisation of business cycles may vary across country pairs in a model of trade
due to comparative advantage.
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emerge as input suppliers for industries in others − are an increasingly impor-
tant phenomenon in the global economy: recent estimates suggest that they
have been responsible for 30-50% of the expansion of world trade since 1970
(Hummels et al., 2001; Yi, 2003). A growing literature explores the influence
of trade in intermediate goods in different areas of macroeconomics: Yi (2003,
2010) first introduced input trade in standard international macro models,
showing that this improves the ability of quantitative trade models to account
for the growth of trade during the second half the 20th century, and the size
of the perceived “home bias” in international trade; Bems et al. (2011) use a
global input-output framework to study the decline of international trade dur-
ing the global recession of 2008-09; Bems (2014) highlights the importance of
intermediate inputs trade when assessing the quantitative response of relative
prices to external rebalancing; finally, Johnson (2014) shows that introducing
intermediate-inputs trade into a standard international business cycle model
improves its ability to replicate the relation between bilateral trade and busi-
ness cycle co-movement.
Our model can be viewed as a stylised version of the many-country, input-
output model of international business cycles in Johnson (2014). By adopting
stark but tractable assumptions about the nature of international production
linkages, production technologies and country sizes we are able to derive an-
alytically several predictions about international business cycle co-movement
which seem to accord with the data. In particular, our simple model allows us
to cast the spotlight on the cross-country correlation of trade balances, and to
illustrate a novel insight: generating a trade surplus over the long run is much
less costly for a country (in utility terms) if other countries generating trade
surpluses at the same time do not share its specialisation pattern; by contrast,
if “similar” countries are attempting to generate a trade surplus at the same
time, the resultingly depressed terms of trade imply that lower consumption
levels and leisure are required to maintain the same external position in a given
country.2
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some
empirical evidence about countries’ specialisation in international production
networks, and the association between specialisation and business-cycle co-
2Casual comments by policy makers suggest that production linkages, specialisation pat-
terns and the cross-country allocation of trade surpluses are understood to play an important
role in external adjustment episodes in practice. For example, contrary to the conventional
wisdom about German export surpluses in the context of the euro-area crisis, the Spanish
government explicitly defended Germany’s surpluses in the autumn of 2013 on the basis that
"...Spain benefits from Germany’s export success because so many of Spain’s own exports to
Europe’s largest economy come in the form of intermediate goods. Spanish shipments of car
parts and chemicals are then used by German companies to create finished products that are
in turn sold overseas.” (Financial Times, November 19th, 2013)
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movement. Section 3 outlines a many-country model with different special-
isation patterns and different country sizes which we use to interpret that
evidence. We also use the model to assess the determinants of the costs of
servicing a given level of external liabilities. Section 4 offers some conclusions.
2 Empirical Evidence
2.1 Data and Variables
In the following, we use data from two main sources: the value of trade in inter-
mediate and final goods from the World Input Output database (WIOD), and
seasonally adjusted GDP and net exports statistics from the OECD quarterly
national accounts.
The WIOD provides a global input-output table covering 40 economies,
detailing the value of goods purchased from 35 industries in each country by
the same 35 industries as well as 5 “final” sectors (roughly, consumption, in-
vestment and government spending) in each country. The WIOD covers the
years 1995-2011, and makes it possible to identify the value of exports of each
country-industry, as well as the share of these exports being used as interme-
diate goods by industries in the importing countries.3 We use this information
to calculate, for each country, the average share of intermediate goods in the
value of exports across the 16 goods (i.e. manufacturing) industries in the
WIOD, and treat this statistic as a measure of the country’s specialisation in
international production networks.
GDP and trade-balance correlations are calculated in line with standard
practice in the international business cycles literature. We de-trend quarterly
data on seasonally adjusted constant-dollar GDP and net exports as a share
of GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Business-cycle correlations are then
derived as the simple pairwise correlation of the de-trended GDPs and trade
balances. We restrict ourselves to the years 1990-2014 for calculating the cor-
relations, in line with the time coverage of the WIOD. Combining the OECD
and WIOD data, we end up with pairwise correlations and specialisation mea-
sures for a sample of 30 major economies.
3While the construction of international input-output tables generally needs to rely on
so-called “import proportionality” assumptions to allocate the observed use of imports by
industries and final consumers to their likely countries of origin, the WIOD improves on
common practices by using more dis-aggregated trade data in order to ensure that propor-
tionality assumptions are only used within use categories (intermediate or final), rather than
across those categories (see Timmer et al., 2015). This makes it especially suitable for our
purpose.
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2.2 Specialisation Patterns
In this section, we first describe the international specialisation patterns −
in intermediate inputs or final goods − which we obtain from the data. To
illustrate the importance of international trade in intermediate goods, Figure 1
reports the dollar value of U.S. imports from (left-hand panel) and exports to
(right-hand panel) various trade partners for the year 2005, segmented by use
category. Trade partners are ranked by the corresponding volume of trade. In
both panels, the red segment of each bar represents the value of goods shipped
for use as intermediate inputs, whereas the green segment represents the value
of final goods shipped. For example, out of a total of $300 billion dollars of
U.S. imports from Canada, just over a third were imports of final goods, with
the remaining two thirds accounted for by intermediate-good imports.4 More
generally, the right-hand panel shows that most of the value of U.S. exports
to its various trading partners in 2005 was derived from intermediate-good
shipments.
In the following, we will use the simple average of the share of intermedi-
ates in a country’s exports across the 16 WIOD manufacturing industries as a
measure of the country’s specialisation in international production networks.
Figure 2 reports the 2005 value of this statistic for each of the countries in
our sample. Countries are ranked from lowest to highest intermediate-good
content of exports. In comparison with the rest of the sample, Greece appears
to be most specialised in final goods, while Indonesia appears to be primar-
ily an intermediates exporter. Note also that the U.S. has a relatively high
intermediate-good content of exports.
Our preferred measure of specialisation is the simple average of the inter-
mediates share of exports across industries. Alternatively, we could weight
each industry by its share in the country’s overall manufacturing exports −
which is equivalent to aggregating all industries into one and calculating the in-
termediate share of exports for the country’s manufacturing sector as a whole.
Figure 3 plots these two alternative measures of specialisation against each
other. The figure shows that, with the exception of Australia, all observations
are roughly distributed along a straight line. This suggests that, for most
countries, a high aggregate intermediates share of exports is driven by a high
intermediate-goods content of exports at the industry level, rather than by
composition effects. Not surprisingly in the light of this finding, our results
below are robust to the use of either specialisation measure.
Figure 4 shows that our measure of specialisation is relatively persistent
4Note that U.S. imports from each of its trading partners exceeded U.S. exports to that
trading partner in 2005, reflecting the U.S. trade deficit in that year.
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over time. We plot each country’s measure of the intermediate-goods content
of exports for the year 2011 against the corresponding value for the year 1995
and find that most observations are roughly aligned along the 45-degree line.
For the regressions below, we will use the 2005 value of countries’ intermediate-
goods content of exports, but all results are robust to using other years, or the
1995-2011 average.
2.3 Production Structures and Business-Cycle Correla-
tions
We now turn to the relationship between similarity in specialisation patterns
and business-cycle correlations. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics
for the correlations of GDPs and net exports among our sample countries.
As is well known, cross-country correlations in GDP fluctuations are gener-
ally positive but there is a large degree of variation in the observed pairwise
correlations. Cross-country trade-balance correlations have received less at-
tention in the literature. We find that the average net-export correlation is
close to zero. However, just as with GDPs, there is significant variation in the
correlation of trade balances across country pairs.
Table 2 analyses the relationship between similarity in specialisation − as
measured by countries’ average intermediates share of industry-level exports
− and business-cycle synchronisation. It reports the results from running an
OLS regression with the pairwise GDP correlation as the dependent variable
and the pairwise absolute difference between specialisation measures as the
main independent variable. We also use the log of distance between country
pairs as an additional control since GDP correlations are known to decline
with distance. In the first five columns, we use simple industry averages to
construct our specialisation measure, whereas in the sixth column we use the
weighted average. In the first two columns we consider all countries, whereas
in columns three and four we exclude non-OECD countries. In columns five
and six we exclude Australia only.
In line with the earlier literature, we find a robust and statistically signif-
icant negative relationship between distance and GDP correlations. In addi-
tion, differences in countries’ specialisation patterns appear to reduce business-
cycle synchronisation. This effect is statistically and economically significant:
our estimates in column (2) suggest that an increase in specialisation differ-
ences from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the country-pair distribution
should be associated with a reduction in the pairwise GDP correlation by
6
.07.5 The effect appears to be weaker for OECD countries, but this may be
due to the fact that there is less variation in specialisation patterns in this
much smaller, more homogeneous sample.
Table 3 repeats the regression analysis presented in Table 2 with net-export
correlations as the dependent variable. We find little evidence of a relation-
ship between distance and net export correlations but, once again, observe
that specialisation differences appear to go hand-in-hand with lower trade-
balance correlations. This effect is statistically and economically significant,
and very robust: again, our estimates in column (2) suggest that an increase in
specialisation differences from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the country-
pair distribution should be associated with a fall in the pairwise net-export
correlation by .07.
If trade balances respond to GDP shocks, it is conceivable that the associ-
ation between trade-balance correlations and specialisation differences results
from the relationship between GDP correlations and specialisation differences
documented above. To assess this, we regress the correlation of net exports
on the part of the GDP correlation explained by specialisation differences. In
a first stage, we instrument for the GDP correlation with the similarity proxy
(as well as the log of distance). In the second stage, reported in Table 4, we
regress the net-export correlation on the instrumented GDP correlation. The
results suggest that the intuition set out above may be correct: differences
in specialisation patterns result in less correlated business cycles, and these
in turn reduce the correlation of trade balances. In the rest of the paper we
formalise this intuition and explore some of its implications for the costs of
servicing a given level of foreign liabilities through trade surpluses.
3 The Model
Consider a world with one large country and a continuum of small countries.6
There is an infinitely-lived representative consumer in each country n with
instantaneous utility function
U [Ct(n), Lt(n)] = lnCt(n)− Lt(n)
1+η
1 + η
, (1)
5For comparison, an increase in distance from the 10th to the 90th percentile of the
country-pair distribution would reduce the pairwise GDP correlation by .26.
6In accordance with some of the evidence presented above, we think of the U.S. as the
large country. Figure 5 plots the share of output of each country in our sample over the
total sample output for the year 2005. The U.S. stands out as the largest country, with a
large advantage over the second-largest country, Japan.
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where C denotes final consumption and L denotes labour. Consumers max-
imise the expected present value of lifetime utility, valued with a common
discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
Let there be a total mass 2− n∗ of small countries. All n ∈ [0, 1] produce
a unique variety of F -good. F -goods are used in final consumption. All
n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] produce a unique variety of M -good, whereas the large country
produces a mass n∗ of varieties of theM -good. M -goods serve as intermediate
inputs in the production of F -goods, which are produced by aggregating labour
services and a CES aggregator of all available M -goods in a Cobb-Douglas
fashion:
QFt(n) =
(
At(n)LFt(n)
1− γ
)1−γ [ˆ 2
1
(
Xt(m,n)
γ
) ε−1
ε
dm
] γε
ε−1
. (2)
M -goods are produced with labour only:
QMt(n) = At(n)LMt(n), (3)
QMt(n
∗) = A∗tL
∗
Mt. (4)
Lkt(n) is labour used in the production of variety n of good k, At(n) is labour
productivity in country n, and Xt(m,n) denotes the use of variety m of good
M as intermediate input in the production of n, with k ∈ {F,M} and aster-
isks denoting aggregate variables in the large country. The parameter ε ≥ 1
captures the elasticity of substitution between varieties of different goods, and
the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) reflects the “intermediate-input intensity” of final
production.
Final consumption in each country is a CES aggregator of F -goods:
Ct(n) =
[ˆ 1
0
Ct(f, n)
ε−1
ε df
] ε
ε−1
. (5)
All goods and labour markets are perfectly competitive. Varieties of F -goods
and M -goods can be traded freely between countries. We find it convenient
to take the price of the final good as the numéraire.
We consider two different scenarios: one in which consumers cannot trade
assets internationally (financial autarky), and one in which consumers can also
trade a complete set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities (complete
asset markets).
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3.1 Financial Autarky
In the Appendix we discuss the model’s equilibrium conditions. Manipulating
them we can obtain expressions for each country-type’s world income share.
In the case of F -good producers,
Wt(n)Lt(n)
Yt
= (1− γ) [At (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1)
´ 1
0
[At (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) dn
, (6)
where
Yt ≡
ˆ 2−n∗
0
Wt(n)Lt(n)dn+W
∗
t L
∗
t (7)
denotes world income: due to perfect competition, the only source of income
in the model is labour income.
Note that the shares in world income of producers of different types of
goods are isolated from whatever happens to the other type. This is due to
the unitary elasticity of substitution implicit in the Cobb-Douglas production
function for F -goods: world expenditure on final output is always split in
proportion (1− γ) for the producers of final goods and γ for the producers of
intermediate inputs used in the production of those final goods, ensuring that
the aggregation of income over all producers of a type always yields a constant
share of world GDP.
How individual F -goods producers’ incomes compare with one another de-
pends on their relative productivity shocks. Since the elasticity of substitution
between varieties of final goods is larger than one (by assumption), final-good
producers with higher productivity levels command larger market shares in the
final-goods market and thus earn a higher income share than low-productivity
final-good producers. By the law of large numbers, the income of F -good
producers only depends on the realisation of their own productivity level: the
average realisation of productivities of F -good producers is always the same.
In the case of M -good producers,
Wt(n)Lt(n)
Yt
= γ
[At (n)]
ε−1
ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
, (8)
W ∗t L
∗
t
Yt
= γ
n∗
(
A∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
. (9)
The presence of a largeM -good producer makes a difference forM -producing
countries, as the productivity shifter A∗ contributes to a positive correlation
9
between the income shares of any two small M -good producers. A shock to
A∗ also raises world income, Yt, but alters its distribution because the result-
ing changes in world prices affect different countries differently: a stronger
terms-of-trade response implies that the GDP of F -good producers will rise
proportionally with world income, while the GDP of small M -good producers
will rise less than proportionally. Thus, the incomes of country pairs with
similar specialisation patterns are more positively correlated than the incomes
of country pairs with different specialisations.7
3.2 Complete Asset Markets8
Let us now assume now that representative agents can also trade a complete set
of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities. In this section we first show that
the results we derived above under financial autarky also hold in the presence of
asset trade. More importantly, allowing for international asset trade enables us
to study the implications of international differences in specialisation patterns
for the trade balance (which is, of course, zero under financial autarky), and
how changes in asset positions affect different types of countries according to
the environment they find themselves in.
With complete asset markets, the competitive-market equilibrium alloca-
tions coincide with those of the solution to the following planner problem:
max
{Ct(n),Lt(n)}n,t
E0
{
βt
[ˆ 2−n∗
0
θ(n)U [Ct(n), Lt(n)] dn+ θ
∗U (C∗t , L
∗
t )
]}
(10)
subject to ˆ 2−n∗
0
Ct(n)dn+ C
∗
t ≤ Yt. (11)
θ(n) ≥ 0 represents the planner’s weight on country n, which depends on its
expected future income and initial foreign asset position, and
´ 2−n∗
0
θ(n)dn+
θ∗ = 1.
The above expressions for pricing conditions, goods-market clearing con-
ditions and labour demands still hold under complete asset markets. The
solution to the planner’s problem above yields final-consumption levels
Ct(n) = θ(n)Yt, (12)
C∗t = θ
∗Yt, (13)
7The correlation between the incomes of any small M -country and the large country is
lower than the correlation between any two small M -countries, as a positive shock to A∗
contributes negatively to the income of the former and positively to the income of the latter.
8See the Appendix for the derivation of all the results discussed here.
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and labour supplies
Lt(n)
η =
∂Yt/∂Lt(n)
θ(n)Yt
, (14)
L∗ηt =
∂Yt/∂L
∗
t
θ∗Yt
. (15)
With complete asset markets, a country’s consumption level is insulated
from any idiosyncratic risk. Its representative consumer simply receives a share
of world output (the size of which depends on her share of world wealth in
the decentralised equilibrium, as we show in Section 3.2.3). A country’s labor
supply now increases in the states of nature in which its marginal contribution
to world income is high.
3.2.1 Income Shares
Manipulation of the equilibrium conditions yields expressions for each country-
type’s world income share. In the case of F -good producers,
Wt(n)Lt(n)
Yt
= (1− γ)
[
At(n)1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
´ 1
0
[
At(n)1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
dn
. (16)
In the case of M -good producers:
Wt(n)Lt(n)
Yt
= γ
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
, (17)
W ∗t L
∗
t
Yt
= γ
n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
(18)
These expressions are very similar to the ones we obtained under financial
autarky and display qualitatively similar results: the incomes of country pairs
with similar specialisation patterns are more positively correlated than the
incomes of country pairs with different specialisations.
The differences between equations (6), (8) and (9) and (16)-(18) boil down
to the presence of parameters θ and η. Parameter η controls the elasticity
of labour supply, which now reacts to changes in the marginal product of
labour.9 This modifies the quantitative response of income shares to produc-
9In a decentralised equilibrium under financial autarky, the substitution effect from a
higher wage is exactly compensated by the corresponding wealth effect, thus leaving labour
supply constant. With complete asset markets, the substitution effect continues to be
11
tivity shocks. Parameter θ (n) is the corresponding country’s planner weight.
We will show in Section 3.2.3 that it maps into the country’s share of world
wealth in the decentralised equilibrium. The higher θ (n), the less need for
country n to generate individual income, as a larger share of world income
accrues to it anyway.
3.2.2 Trade Balances
Define NXt(n) as the trade balance of country n at time t:
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
= 1− Ct(n)
Wt(n)Lt(n)
= 1− 1
Lt(n)1+η
= 1− θ(n)Yt
Wt(n)Lt(n)
(19)
Substituting the income share we obtained above yields the following expres-
sion for the case of F -good producers:
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
= 1− θ(n)
1− γ
´ 1
0
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
dn[
At(n)1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
. (20)
Similarly, for M -good producers we obtain
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
= 1− θ(n)
γ
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
, (21)
NX∗t
Y ∗t
= 1− θ
∗
γ
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
. (22)
In the decentralised equilibrium, a shock to A∗ raises Yt and changes world
relative prices. The resulting terms-of-trade changes offer insurance to F -good
producers in the sense that their incomes rise proportionally to world income.
However, M -producers experience a fall in their share of world GDP.10 With
complete asset markets, goods flow from the large country to the other, small
M -good producers as insurance payment in this scenario. The correlation
of net exports is therefore also higher for country pairs that share the same
specialisation pattern than for country pairs with different specialisations.
present, whereas the wealth effect is not, as a country’s consumption is no longer linked
to its income.
10See Cuñat and Fons-Rosen (2013) for a related argument.
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3.2.3 Decentralisation
A comparison between the planner’s problem and the representative agent’s
optimisation problem in the decentralised equilibrium helps us illustrate the
effect of a given level of foreign liabilities on consumption and labour supply.
In the decentralised equilibrium, the representative consumer in country n
solves
max
{Ct(n,st),Lt(n,st)}st
∞∑
t=0
βt
ˆ
st
pit(st)U [Ct(n, st), Lt (n, st)] dst (23)
subject to
∞∑
t=0
ˆ
st
qt(st)Ct(n, st)dst ≤
∞∑
t=0
ˆ
st
qt(st)Wt(n, st)Lt(n, st)dst −B0(n), (24)
where pit (st) denotes the probability of state of nature s at time t, qt (st) is the
price of an Arrow-Debreu security yielding one unit of consumption in state s
at time t, and B0 (n) represents country n’s net foreign liabilities as of period
0.11 One can show that the solution of this problem implies
θ(n) = (1− β)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
ˆ
st
pit(st)
Wt(n, st)Lt(n, st)
Yt(st)
dst − B0(n)
Y0
]
. (25)
A country’s planner weight, θ (n), thus corresponds to a measure of its initial
wealth, consisting of two terms: a first term reflecting the discounted expected
share of country n in world GDP going forward, and a second term representing
n’s initial liabilities relative to initial world GDP. Note that, from (16)-(18),
the first term depends implicitly on {θ (n)}n. However, as demonstrated in
the Appendix, θ (n) < θ (n′) implies B0 (n) > B0 (n′) for all n 6= n′, everything
else constant.
Consider now a country with a high initial level of indebtedness, B0 (n).
This country will need to run trade surpluses in the future in order to service
its liabilities. Doing so implies foregoing some final consumption and supplying
a larger level of labor for the indebted country: a higher initial level of net
foreign liabilities lowers θ (n), thus prompting a lower consumption level, by
equation (12), and a larger supply of labor, by equation (14).
However, if other countries with the same specialisation pattern also have
a low planner weight − also due to a high level of foreign liabilities, say −, this
will reduce country n’s expected share of future incomes, by equations (16)
and (17), further lowering θ (n). Hence, servicing a given amount of initial
liabilities under these circumstances will require an increased effort in terms
11Note that
´ 2−n∗
0
B0(n)dn+B
∗ = 0.
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of foregone consumption and leisure.
4 Conclusion
This paper draws attention to the importance of countries’ specialisation pat-
terns in understanding the international transmission of business cycles as well
as the cost of servicing a given level of foreign liabilities. It explores a conse-
quence of the increasing vertical disintegration of production structures into
global value added chains in which countries become suppliers of intermediate
goods or producers of final goods.
Our empirical evidence distinguishes between intermediate-goods produc-
ers and final-good producers using a very crude statistic − the intermediate-
goods content of a country’s sectoral exports. We document that, despite
its simplicity, this statistic appears to capture significant differences between
countries which affect the international transmission of business cycles. A very
simple model of specialisation reproduces the main stylised facts featured in
the data. The model can also be used to assess the determinants of the utility
cost to a country of servicing a given level of foreign liabilities. It highlights the
importance of the distribution of foreign assets among the country’s trading
partners: if many countries with the same specialisation pattern are servicing
a high level of foreign liabilities, doing so will require all of them to forgo more
consumption and leisure.
The evidence and theory presented here suggest a host of questions for
future research. For example, it would be important to establish whether the
empirical findings presented here are robust to the use of more sophisticated,
bilateral measures of vertical integration, and whether there are other key
determinants of trade balance correlations. We plan to address these issues in
future work.
Finally, our theory highlights as-yet unexploited avenues for empirical re-
search. The GDP correlations implicit in our model suggest that final-good
producers have an incentive to invest foremost in other, economically sizeable
final-good producers, as productivity shocks in the latter affect the incomes
of the former countries in the opposite direction. A symmetric argument ap-
plies to intermediate-input-producing countries. In this manner, the theory
outlined above could be used to derive, and test, implications for international
investment portfolios.
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Figure 1: U.S. Trade in Intermediate and Final Goods
Figure 2: Intermediate-Good Content of Exports
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Figure 3: Alternative Measures of Specialisation
Figure 4: Intermediate-Good Content of Exports Over Time
16
Figure 5: Country Shares of Sample Output
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Variable Obs. Mean Min. Max. 
Corr(Y1,Y2) 435 .553 -.212 .935 
     
Corr(NX1/Y1,NX2/Y2) 435 .024 -.563 .625 
 
Note: 30 countries, 1990-2014 
Table 1: Business-Cycle Correlations − Summary Statistics
Dep. variable: goods average goods average goods average, goods average, goods average, wgt. average, 
Corr(Y1,Y2)   OECD 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
w/o Australia w/o Australia 
Difference 
inputs/exports 
-2.231 -0.878 -1.200 -0.188 -0.895 -0.647 
 (0.389)*** (0.365)** (0.460)*** (0.417) (0.381)** (0.174)*** 
Log distance 
(capitals, km) 
 -0.094  -0.071 -0.089 -0.086 
  (0.008)***  (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
Adj. R2 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.25 
Observations 435 435 276 276 406 406 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 2: GDP Correlations
Dep. variable: goods average goods average goods average, goods average, goods average, wgt. average, 
Corr(NX1/Y1,NX2/Y2)   OECD 
countries 
OECD 
countries 
w/o Australia w/o Australia 
Difference 
inputs/exports 
-0.942 -0.837 -1.175 -1.035 -1.146 -0.297 
 (0.330)*** (0.348)** (0.431)*** (0.458)** (0.359)*** (0.166)* 
Log distance (capitals, 
km) 
 -0.007  -0.010 -0.011 -0.017 
  (0.009)  (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)* 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 
Observations 435 435 276 276 406 406 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 3: NX Correlations
Dep. variable: goods avg. goods avg. goods avg., goods avg., goods avg., wgt. avg., 
Corr(NX1/Y1,NX2/Y2)   OECD OECD w/o Australia w/o Australia 
Corr(Y1,Y2) 0.422 0.953 0.979 5.497 1.280 1.280 
 (0.155)*** (0.527)* (0.513)* (12.338) (0.638)** (0.638)** 
Log distance  0.083  0.383 0.102 0.102 
  (0.055)  (0.892) (0.062)* (0.062)* 
F statistic 7.40 2.58 3.64 0.15 3.01 3.01 
Observations 435 435 276 276 406 406 
Instruments Diff. inp./exp. Diff. inp./exp., Diff. 
inp./exp. 
Diff. inp./exp., Diff. inp./exp., Diff. inp./exp., 
  Log dist.  Log dist. Log dist. Log dist. 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 4: NX Correlations (Instrumented)
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A Appendix
A.1 Competitive Pricing, Goods Market Clearing, and
Labor Demand
Competitive pricing conditions yield
PMt(n) =
Wt(n)
At(n)
, (26)
P ∗Mt =
W ∗t
A∗t
, (27)
PFt(n) =
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
]1−γ [ˆ 2
1
PMt(n)
1−εdn
] γ
1−ε
, (28)
1 =
[ˆ 1
0
PFt(n)
1−εdn
] 1
1−ε
. (29)
Goods market-clearing requires
QFt(f) =
ˆ 2−n∗
0
Ct(f, n)dn+ C
∗
t (f), (30)
QMt(m) =
ˆ 2
1
Xt(m,n)dn. (31)
Labour demand is given by the following expressions:
Lt(n) =
LtF (n) = QFt (n) /At (n) ∀ : n ∈ [0, 1]LtM(n) = QMt (n) /At (n) ∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] , (32)
L∗t = n
∗L∗Mt = QMt (n
∗) /A∗t . (33)
Combining (26)-(29),
1 =
{ˆ 1
0
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
](1−γ)(1−ε)
dn
[ˆ 2−n∗
1
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
]1−ε
dn+ n∗
(
W ∗t
A∗t
)1−ε]γ} 11−ε
.
(34)
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From utility/profit maximisation and goods market clearing, we find that
Wt(n)Lt(n) = (1− γ)
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
](1−γ)(1−ε)
´ 1
0
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
](1−γ)(1−ε)
dn
Yt ∀ : n ∈ [0, 1] , (35)
Wt(n)Lt(n) = γ
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
]1−ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
]1−ε
dn+ n∗
(
W ∗t
A∗t
)1−εYt ∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] ,(36)
W ∗t L
∗
t = γ
n∗
(
W ∗t
A∗t
)1−ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[
Wt(n)
At(n)
]1−ε
dn+ n∗
(
W ∗t
A∗t
)1−εYt, (37)
where Yt ≡
´ 2−n∗
0
Wt(n)Lt(n)dn+W
∗
t L
∗
t .
A.2 Financial Autarky: Income Shares
Under financial autarky, and given the preferences we assumed, it is easy
to show that labour supply equals 1 in every country-period. This result,
combined with equations (35)-(37), yields equations (6)-(9).
A.3 Complete Asset Markets
A.3.1 Consumption and Labour Supply
With complete asset markets and competitive product markets the market
equilibrium of the world economy coincides with the solution of the planner
problem
max
{Ct(n),Lt(n)}n,t
E0
{
βt
ˆ 2−n∗
0
θ(n)U [Ct(n), Lt(n)] dn+ θ
∗U (C∗t , L
∗
t )
}
(38)
subject to
ˆ 2−n∗
0
Ct(n)dn+ C
∗
t ≤
ˆ 2−n∗
0
Wt(n)Lt(n)dn+W
∗
t L
∗
t ≡ Yt, (39)
where θ(n) ≥ 0 represents the planner weight on country n (which depends on
its expected future income and initial foreign asset position),
´ 2−n∗
0
θ(n)dn +
θ∗ = 1, and {Wnt}n,t are as pinned down by (26)-(29).
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The first-order conditions of the planner problem are
βtθ(n)
1
Ct(n)
− λt = 0, (40)
βtθ∗
1
C∗t
− λt = 0, (41)
−βtθ(n)Lt(n)η + λt ∂Yt
∂Lt(n)
= 0, (42)
−βtθ∗L∗ηt + λt
∂Yt
∂L∗t
= 0, (43)
which yield (12)-(15).
A.3.2 Income Shares
From (36) and (37),
Wt (n)Lt (n)
W ∗t L∗t
=
1
n∗
[
A∗t
At(n)
Wt (n)
W ∗t
]1−ε
∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] , (44)
Wt (n)
W ∗t
=
{
1
n∗
[
A∗t
At (n)
]1−ε
L∗t
Lt (n)
} 1
ε
∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] , (45)
Wt (n)
At (n)
=
[
A∗tL
∗
t
n∗At (n)Lt (n)
] 1
ε W ∗t
A∗t
∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] . (46)
Similarly, from (35),
Wt (n)
At (n)
=
[
At (1)Lt (1)
At (n)Lt (n)
] 1
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) Wt (1)
At (1)
∀ : n ∈ [0, 1] . (47)
Substituting (47) into (37),
W ∗t
A∗t
= γ
n∗ (A∗tL
∗
t )
−1
´ 2−n∗
1
[
A∗tL∗t
n∗At(n)Lt(n)
] 1−ε
ε
dn+ n∗
Yt, (48)
W ∗t
A∗t
= γ
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
)− 1
ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
Yt. (49)
Similarly, substituting (47) into (35),
Wt(1)
At(1)
= (1− γ) [At(1)Lt(1)]
− 1
1+(1−γ)(ε−1)
´ 1
0
[At (n)Lt (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) dn
Yt. (50)
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From the normalisation (29),
Yt =

[´ 1
0
[At (n)Lt (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) dn
] 1+(1−γ)(ε−1)
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1− γ

(1−γ)
× (51)
×

[´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
γ

γ
.
This gives us
∂Yt/∂Lt(n)
Yt
=
At (n)
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) Lt (n)
− 1
1+(1−γ)(ε−1)
´ 1
0
[At (n)Lt (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) dn
(1− γ) ∀ : n ∈ [0, 1] ,
(52)
∂Yt/∂Lt(n)
Yt
=
At (n)
ε−1
ε Lt (n)
− 1
ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
γ ∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] ,
(53)
∂Yt/∂L
∗
t
Yt
=
n∗
(
A∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
L
∗− 1
ε
t
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
γ ∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] .
(54)
Using (14) and (52) implies, after some manipulation,
Lt(n) =

1− γ
θ(n)
[
At(n)1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
´ 1
0
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
dn

1
1+η
∀ : n ∈ [0, 1] . (55)
Combining (14) with (53) and (54),
Lt(n) =
[
θ∗
n∗θ(n)
] ε
1+ηε
[
n∗At(n)
A∗t
] ε−1
1+ηε
L∗t ∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] . (56)
Substituting (56) into (54),
L∗t =
 γθ∗
n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε

1
1+η
, (57)
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which can be used with (56) to obtain
Lt(n) =
 γθ(n)
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε

1
1+η
∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] .
(58)
Substituting (47) in (35),
Wt(n)Lt(n)
Yt
= (1− γ) [At (n)Lt (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1)
´ 1
0
[At (n)Lt (n)]
(1−γ)(ε−1)
1+(1−γ)(ε−1) dn
∀ : n ∈ [0, 1] , (59)
and (46) in (36) and (37),
Wt(n)Lt(n)
Yt
= γ
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] ,
(60)
W ∗t L
∗
t
Yt
= γ
n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
´ 2−n∗
1
[At (n)Lt (n)]
ε−1
ε dn+ n∗
(
A∗tL∗t
n∗
) ε−1
ε
. (61)
Now, substituting (55) into (59), and (57) and (58) into (60) and (61) yields
equations (16)-(18).
A.3.3 Trade Balances
Define NXt(n) as the trade balance of country n at time t. Then,
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
= 1− Ct(n)
Wt(n)Lt(n)
= 1− 1
Lt(n)1+η
, (62)
NX∗t
Y ∗t
= 1− C
∗
t
W ∗t L∗t
= 1− 1
Lt∗1+η
, (63)
where the second equality follows from (12)-(15). Substituting in (55), (57)
and (58),
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
= 1− θ(n)
1− γ
´ 1
0
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
dn[
At(n)1+η
θ(n)
] (1−γ)(ε−1)
1+η+η(1−γ)(ε−1)
= 1−θ(n) Yt
Wt(n)Lt(n)
∀ : n ∈ [0, 1] ,
(64)
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
= 1− θ(n)
γ
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
=
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= 1− θ(n) Yt
Wt(n)Lt(n)
∀ : n ∈ [1, 2− n∗] (65)
NX∗t
Y ∗t
= 1− θ
∗
γ
´ 2−n∗
1
[
At(n)
1+η
θ(n)
] ε−1
1+ηε
dn+ n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
n∗
(
A∗t 1+η
n∗ηθ∗
) ε−1
1+ηε
= 1− θ∗ Yt
W ∗t L∗t
. (66)
Note that this implies that
Cov
[
NXt(n)
Yt(n)
,
NXt(d)
Yt(d)
]
= θ(n)θ(d)Cov
[
Yt
Wt(n)Lt(n)
,
Yt
Wt(d)Lt(d)
]
. (67)
A.3.4 Decentralised Equilibrium
Suppose agents can trade a full set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securi-
ties, with qt(st) denoting the price of security which delivers one unit of final
consumption in period t and state st. Then the representative consumer in
country n solves
max
{Ct(n,st),Lt(n,st)}st
∞∑
t=0
βt
ˆ
st
pit(st)U [Ct(n, st), Lt (n, st)] dst (68)
subject to
∞∑
t=0
ˆ
st
qt(st)Ct(n, st)dst ≤
∞∑
t=0
ˆ
st
qt(st)Wt(n, st)Lt(n, st)dst −B0(n), (69)
where U [·, ·] is still defined as in (1). Note that
ˆ 2−n∗
0
B0(n)dn+B
∗ = 0. (70)
The first-order conditions of this problem are
βtpit(st)
1
Ct(n, st)
− λ(n)qt(st) = 0, (71)
−βtpit(st)Lt(n, st)η + λ(n)qt(st)Wt(n, st) = 0, (72)
and market clearing requires
ˆ 2−n∗
0
Ct(n, st)dn+C
∗
t (st) =
ˆ 2−n∗
0
Wt(n, st)Lt(n, st)dn+W
∗
t (st)L
∗
t (st) ≡ Yt(st).
(73)
From (71) and (73),
βtpit(st)
qt(st)
[ˆ 2−n∗
0
1
λ(n)
dn+
1
λ∗
]
= Yt(st), (74)
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so
Ct(n, st) =
1
λ(n)[´ 2−n∗
0
1
λ(n)
dn+ 1
λ∗
]Yt(st), (75)
and 1
λ(n)
/
[´ 2−n∗
0
1
λ(n)
dn+ 1
λ∗
]
thus corresponds to the “planner weight” θ(n)
from the planner problem.
Substituting (71) into (69),
1
λ(n)
= (1− β)
[ ∞∑
t=0
ˆ
st
qt(st)Wt(n, st)Lt(n, st)dst −B0(n)
]
. (76)
Now substituting (74) into (76),
θ(n) = (1− β)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
ˆ
st
pit(st)
Wt(n, st)Lt(n, st)
Yt(st)
dst − B0(n)
Y0
]
. (77)
Consider two countries n and n′ such that θ (n) < θ (n′). From equation (17),
country n’s income share will be higher than that of country n’, everything
else constant. From equation (77), θ (n) < θ (n′) must therefore imply that
B0 (n) > B0 (n
′).
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